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CIVIL PnoCEDURE-HABBAS CoRPus-Turn:AusnoN OP STATE REMEDms
RENnrnoN CASES-Respondent, a convict, was apprehended in Ohio after
escaping from an Alabama prison. He attempted to prevent rendition by petitioning the Ohio courts for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had suffered cruel and unusual punishment in the Alabama prison contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment and, if forced to return, would be subject to further
brutal treatment. His petition was denied at all levels in the Ohio courts and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 A similar petition was
then denied by the Federal District Court in Ohio, but the court of appeals
reversed without opinion and ordered a hearing on the merits.2 On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The remedies of the state
of incarceration must be exhausted before a federal court can consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Sweeney v. Woodall, (U. S. 1952) 73 S. Ct.
139.
This decision carries to a logical conclusion the doctrine that one who seeks
a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court alleging the unconstitutionality of
state custody must first exhaust all state remedies. 3 The Supreme Court has
explained this rule in terms of comity between courts when the state court fust
secures jurisdiction, of a presumption that state courts will follow the law of
IN

11 "The infinite possibilities of injury which exist aboard a ship render precedent of
negligible assistance in determining what contents the courts will pour into the flask
labelled 'unseaworthiness.' Few would have thought that the presence on board of a
brutal mate or a greenhorn untrained sailor would render a ship 'unseaworthy'; or that
a seaman would be able to convince a court that he fell in the shower of a docked ship
because the soapy floor rendered it 'unseaworthy.' To the courts has been handed a simple
instrument for the imposition of absolute liability with no limitation but judicial conscience.''
Note, The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal Injury Remedies, 57 YALE
L.J. 243 at 254 (1947).
1 Ex parte Woodall, 88 Ohio App. 202, 89 N.W. (2d) 493 (1949); Ex parte Woodall
v. Sweeney, 142 Ohio St. 368, 89 N.E. (2d) 494 (1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 945, 70
S.Ct. 790 (1950).
2 Woodall v. Sweeney, (6th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 542.
3 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1943). For a compilation of the cases developing the doctrine see
annotations in 94 L.Ed. 785 (1950) and 88 L.Ed. 576 (1944). The doctrine has been
incorporated into the Judicial Code, 62 Stat. L. 967 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §2254: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment
of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective
to protect the rights of the prisoner.
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
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the land, and of.the "delicate" federal-state relations problem created if a federal
district court should overthrow decisions of state tribunals.4 The application of
this doctrine to rendition proceedings had been left in doubt by an earlier
Supreme Court decision which did not make clear whether a fugitive petitioner
had to exhaust the remedies in the state of asylum or the state of incarceration
before proceeding in a federal court.5
In the principal case, the Supreme
Court, per curiam, gave the following reasons for adopting the latter approach:
(I) the prisoner should have no greater rights as a fugitive than he had as a
prisoner in Alabama where he would have had to apply to the state courts;6 (2)
rendition proceedings do not contemplate appearance by the demanding state;7
(3) the federal system requires that the constitutionality of prisoner treatment
be determined by the courts of the state where that treament was dealt out;8 and
( 4) the state of incarceration is a more convenient place to try the issue. The
lone dissent by Justice Douglas was based on the fear that, if the allegations were
true, the prisoner was being sent to a place of extreme personal danger and
possible death before he could assert his constitutional rights.9 This would
seem to be a high price to pay for the maintenance of the principles behind the
rule requiring exhaustion of state remedies. 10 The use of habeas corpus as a
Darr v. Burford, supra note 3, 49 MICJH. L. REv. 611 (1951).
Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, 70 S.Ct. 146 (1949), reversed a holding by the
court of appeals in Johnson v. Dye, (3d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 250, which allowed the
writ in circumstances similar to the principal case in a per curiam opinion citing only Ex
parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1943). The decision was interpreted by some
as requiring exhaustion of remedies in the state of incarceration, Davis v. O'Connel, (8th
Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 513, Johnson v. Mathews, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 667 at
683, note 22, cert. den. 340 U.S. 828, 71 S.Ct. 65 (1950); Gerrish v. New Hampshire,
(D.C. Me. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 527, and by others as meaning exhaustion of remedies in
the state of asylum, United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F.
(2d) 588, cert. den. 339 U.S. 980, 70 S.Ct. 1027 (1950); Ross v. Middlebrooks, (9th
Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 308; Johnson v. Mathews, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 667 at
685, note 1 (dissent), 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 441 (1950), 34 MINN. L. REv. 134 (1950).
Confusion also illustrated in 64 H,uw. L. REv. 271 (1950).
6 If the brutality exists as alleged, it is possible that the prisoner would have no right
to appeal to a state court because of the physical danger involved.
7 Habeas corpus has long been used, however, to test certain aspects of the rendition
proceedings. 47 CoL. L. REv. 470 (1947). An extension of the scope of the writ then
would not be a "seismic innovation."
s This is the argument based primarily on comity, see note 5 supra, and is thus merely
another way of stating the conclusion in this case.
9 Principal case at 141-142.
Douglas assumes that indecently brutal treatment of prisoners by state authorities constitutes a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The point has not yet
been expressly decided. See 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 441 (1950), 64 HARv. L. REv. 271
(1950); Frances v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 401 (1946); Johnson v. Dye, (3d
Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 250, revd. on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864, 70 S.Ct. 146 (1949).
10 See note 5 supra. State courts in the state of asylum have been reluctant to investigate the constitutionality of treatment of a prisoner. Ex parte Wallace, 38 Wash. (2d) 48,
227 P. (2d) 737 (1951); Ex parte Paramore, 95 N.J. Eq. 386, 123 A. 246 (1924); State v.
McClure, 87 Ohio App. 520, 96 N.E. (2d) 308 (1950); People v. Ruthazer, 198 Misc.
1044, 102 N.Y.S. 241 (1950). But such relief has been granted. Commonwealth v.
Supt. of County Prison, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A. (2d) 576 (1943), and see theory in
Ex parte Rae, 215 Mich. 156, 183 N.W. 774 (1921).
4
5
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judicial lever to encourage prison reforms where treatment is considerably below
the standards of decency involves no inherent evil.11 Where a state has
allowed its prisoner treatment to sink to the level of brutality, the inconvenience
to that state of coming to the state of asylum to defend against the great writ is
not a partciularly appealing argument.12 In cases tried under the now repudiated
opposite rule, the courts have handled the problems with competence and with
a due regard for the penal systems of the state of incarceration.13 However,
unless it can be shown that state remedies are unavailable,14 or the Supreme
Court adopts another theory which would avoid the consequences envisioned by
Justice Douglas,15 the use of habeas corpus in this type of case has now been
foreclosed.
Alfred W. Blumrosen

11 Compare exclusionazy rules of evidence as used to control police activities, 50 MICH.
L. REv. 567 (1952).
12 The burden of proof on petitioner to establish past brutal treatment and likelihood
of its continuation should be very great. See note 13 infra.
1a Harper v. Wall, (D.C. N.J. 1949) 95 F. Supp. 771 (writ granted on showing of
brutal treatment); Ex parte Marshall, (D.C. N.J. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 771 (writ denied on
showing that conditions had been rectified in state of incarceration).
14 The Supreme Court expressly reserved this possibility in the principal case. Sweeney
v. Woodall, 73 S.Ct. 139 at 140 (1952) and see statute, note 3 supra.
15 Query whether likelihood of brutal treatment immediately on return to state of
incarceration would "render [state court] process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner" within the meaning of the Judicial Code section quoted in note 3 supra? The
writer in 23 So. CAL. L. RBv. 441 (1950), suggests that rendition of the prisoner by the
state of asylum in these circumstances constitutes "state action" which may be struck down
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

